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  • Who on your board can tell you whether the AI roadmap is serving the business or just the momentum?

    First published on LinkedIn, 12 September 2026. Statistics updated November 2026.

    In short

    • Directors have adopted AI faster than their boards have governed it: 82 per cent have used it in their board work, and only 6 per cent sit on a board with a formal policy for it.
    • AI proposals are capital allocation decisions being overseen with the habits of a technology decision.
    • Three answers a board should have before approving: the business number and its owner, what stops, and who answers when the model is wrong.

    The paper ran to fourteen pages. Twelve of them described the technology. Two described what it would do for customers, and both of those were written in the future tense.

    Nobody in the room asked a bad question. The board asked about cost, timeline, vendor lock-in, and where the data would sit. All reasonable. All the sort of thing a competent board asks. What nobody asked was what the business would be able to do afterwards that it could not do before, stated plainly enough that someone could be held to it.

    The paper was approved.

    I have sat through enough of these to recognise the shape of it. This is not incompetence, and it is not negligence. It is a board applying the oversight habits of a technology decision to what is in fact a capital allocation decision, and the two call for different questions.

    The gap sitting inside the numbers

    Directors are not ignoring AI. In What Directors Think 2026, 38 per cent of directors named deploying AI across the business as a leading priority, and technology adoption is the top area for capital investment, cited by 42 per cent. Research by the Diligent Institute and Corporate Board Member, published in July 2026, found that 82 per cent of directors have used AI in their own board work, up from 66 per cent less than a year earlier.

    The same research found that only 6 per cent have a formal board-specific policy on how directors use it, and 54 per cent have no policy at all.

    Part of the reason is fluency. A board that isn’t confident in a domain asks about the parts of the paper it can assess, which is why AI discussions gravitate to cost, vendor, and data protection. Those are real questions, but they aren’t the governing ones. The governing question is what the business can do afterwards. Anyone can ask it, which is why it’s the board’s question rather than the technology function’s.

    Read those figures next to each other. More than four in five directors have adopted the technology personally. Fewer than one in ten sit on a board that has decided how they may use it. Adoption ran ahead of governance in the one room whose job is governance.

    The picture on results is no more comfortable. In the NACD’s 2026 Governance Outlook, 76 per cent of directors said AI will factor into their growth strategy, yet most organisations reported only slight or moderate success in realising operational or financial benefits from it so far. That is a fair description of where the technology is. It also describes a period in which a great deal of capital gets committed on the strength of direction rather than results.

    Momentum is not a business case.

    The question I have found most useful in these discussions is deliberately blunt. Is this serving the customer and the business, or is it serving the momentum?

    Momentum is not always hype. More often it is inherited. It is the strategy the company has run long enough that nobody remembers deciding on it.

    I worked with an AI business whose product was strong and whose market definition was not. The company had been founded to serve one narrow vertical, and every board discussion was a variation on how to win more of that vertical. The technology roadmap followed the market definition without testing whether it still held.

    The question that moved the discussion wasn’t about the technology. What does this capability do that has nothing to do with the market we chose at the start?

    The answer was cross-vertical automation and optimisation. Financial services was the first market to open, but it wasn’t the market the company had been built around. Repositioning around that capability moved the business from competing for share of one vertical to selling a capability into several. The addressable market didn’t enlarge; it was redefined. The product barely changed. The definition of what the company was for changed completely.

    That is what the momentum question is for. It does not ask whether the technology works. It asks whether the thing the technology is being pointed at is still the right thing.

    The seam where these decisions fail

    I have been on the wrong side of the same gap myself, in a different context.

    Leading a post-acquisition integration for a multinational consumer and industrial goods group, I had board approval, a plan and a clear mandate. What I didn’t have was dedicated resourcing, and I didn’t push hard enough when the board approved the outcome without deciding what we’d give up to get there. The integration stretched to two years. It should have taken about half that time, and the extra year included two field sales forces where one was needed, a duplicated management layer above them, and a second set of systems underneath. Reconstructed at today’s costs, that is somewhere around five and a half million pounds of avoidable spend. It is a reconstruction rather than a figure anyone produced at the time, and that is the part worth noticing. Since no one was asked to own the number, no one produced one.

    I have run every integration since on the lesson: a board that approves an outcome without resourcing the route to it has not made a decision; it has expressed a preference.

    AI proposals fail in that same seam far more often than they fail technically. The model works. The pilot works. Then the capacity it was supposed to release is never reallocated, the process it was supposed to replace runs alongside it for another eighteen months, and the business case quietly becomes a cost.

    Three answers a board should have before it approves

    Not three questions to ask the CTO. Three answers the board itself should be able to give, in its own words, before the paper is approved.

    1. What changes in the business if this works, stated as a number, and which executive owns that number? General efficiency is not an answer. A percentage against a named line, owned by a named person, is.
    2. What does the organisation stop doing? Capacity released and never reallocated is a saving on paper and a cost in practice. If nothing stops, nothing has been saved.
    3. What is the exposure when the model is wrong, and who answers for it? Not who maintains the system. Who answers for the decision it made.

    If those three answers don’t exist, the decision isn’t ready, no matter what the technology is worth.

    None of the three requires the board to understand the model. They require the board to insist that business consequences are considered with the same rigour as technology, and to notice when they aren’t.

    A board that cannot say what an AI investment is supposed to change is not overseeing that investment; it is watching it.

    And if most of your directors are already using AI in their board work while the board has never written down how they may use it, that is the first paper to commission, not the last.

    Terry Irwin is a Non-Executive Director and Board Adviser in the UK and Europe, and helps boards test AI claims, spend and risk. More on his work: AI at board level.

    Terry Irwin

    8 November 2026
  • How does your succession plan handle roles that have never existed before?

    First published on LinkedIn, 19 October 2026.

    In short

    • Succession frameworks assume a predecessor, a handover and a defined role. A growing share of critical roles have none of the three.
    • Roles that are created rather than replaced fail at the specification stage, not the selection stage.
    • Four questions to answer before appointing anyone into a role nobody has held.

    The role had never existed. No predecessor, no handover, and no description beyond a title and four countries. Nobody could tell me what good looked like, because nobody had done it.

    So the first act of the job was not a decision about the business. It was an assessment of the four markets: what each was strong at, what each was weak at, and where to put the effort. That assessment shaped the role, simply because nothing else was going to.

    It worked. The business grew from a standing start to around £30 million of revenue. What I didn’t understand at the time was that it worked by accident of fit rather than design, and that a role defined by whoever happens to hold it cannot be judged by anyone else. There was no standard to measure it against, because I had written it myself.

    What I would say to a board now is that the arrangement carried a risk they never priced. Had the fit been wrong, the first clear indication would have arrived a year and a half later, in the results, because there was no interim standard the role could be held to and no predecessor whose performance offered a comparison. The upside was mine. The exposure was theirs.

    What succession planning actually assumes

    Succession is high on every board agenda, and rightly so. In the NACD’s 2026 Governance Outlook, directors ranked CEO succession planning as the board practice most in need of improvement. A Korn Ferry survey found that only 12 per cent of boards discuss succession five or more times a year. The Conference Board and Heidrick & Struggles have tracked the demographic pressure behind it: around 11 per cent of S&P 500 chief executives are now aged between 65 and 69, up from just over 7 per cent in 2017.

    All of that attention rests on three assumptions. That there is a predecessor. That there is a handover. That someone other than the person who will hold it has defined the role.

    A growing proportion of the roles that now matter most have none of the three.

    The roles boards are creating right now

    Consider what has been added to executive teams in the past two or three years. Heads of AI. Data and analytics leadership. Transformation directors. Roles created because the board concluded the capability was missing, in an area where the board itself has limited fluency.

    These are not succession cases. Nobody is being replaced. No predecessor sets a performance benchmark, no handover to inherit, and often no clear view of what the role owns versus what it advises on. The board applies a replacement framework to a creation problem, then wonders eighteen months later why the appointment hasn’t delivered what was expected.

    The failure is rarely the appointee. Nobody defined the job, so it became whatever the appointee was best at.

    What the board loses

    An undefined role costs the board its ability to diagnose. When the appointment underdelivers, and many do, the board cannot tell whether the role was wrong, the person was wrong, or the definition was never made. Every available remedy is therefore a guess, and the most common guess is to replace the individual, which resets the clock without touching the cause.

    A second cost lands later. A role shaped around its first holder becomes a role only that person can do. When they leave, the board is recruiting against a specification written backwards from an individual, which is why second appointments into invented roles fail more often than first ones.

    There is a recruitment distortion too. With no internal pipeline and no benchmark, boards reach for candidates who hold the title elsewhere, on the reasonable assumption that the title means something. It rarely does. A head of AI at another company was doing that company’s version of the job, defined by its board, its data and its customers. Importing the title imports somebody else’s definition.

    Two different board conversations

    Replacing a chief executive and creating a chief AI officer are treated as the same category of decision, and they are not. The first is a matching problem: the role exists, the requirements are understood, and the board is assessing fit against a specification the organisation already knows how to apply. The second is a design problem, and design problems fail at the specification stage rather than at the selection stage.

    Boards are well equipped for the first and largely unpractised at the second. Nomination committees are built to assess candidates. Very few are built to define a role nobody in the room has ever held, in a domain where the board is, by its own admission, still learning.

    Four questions before appointing to a role that has never existed

    1. What decision does this role own that nobody currently owns? If the answer is that it advises, influences or supports, the role has responsibility without authority, and the first difficult decision will go around it rather than through it.
    2. What is it allowed to stop? A new function that can only add activity will add activity. The authority to stop something is what separates a leadership role from a specialist one.
    3. Who tells the board it is not working, and when? Set the review point before the appointment, not after. A role with no predecessor has no natural performance comparison, so you have to build the comparison deliberately.
    4. What does success look like in twelve months, written down before anyone is hired? If the specification is written after the appointment, it will be written around the person, and the board will have lost the ability to tell whether the role or the individual is the problem.

    The part that transfers

    My own version of this worked out. That is not a defence of how it was done. Being handed four markets and left to define the job produced a result because the fit happened to be right, and the board had no way of knowing in advance whether it would be. They were not running a succession process. They were running a hope with a title attached.

    The remedy is not complicated. Write the specification before the search. Review it at six months against what the person is actually doing, and treat any large divergence as information about the specification rather than about the individual. That single review turns an invented role into a defined one, and a defined role is the only kind that can ever be succeeded.

    A succession plan that only covers roles which already exist is a plan for the part of the organisation that is not changing.

    The roles a board should be most anxious about are the ones with nobody to compare the incumbent to.

    Terry Irwin is a Non-Executive Director and Board Adviser to PE-backed, growth-stage and mid-cap businesses in the UK and Europe. More on his board work: NED and board advisory.

    Terry Irwin

    8 November 2026
  • What are the responsibilities of a non-executive director in a private company?

    UK public companies have long appointed non-executive directors (NEDs) to their boards. More recently, private companies have recognised the value that experienced, objective and regular advice can add to a board. Private equity firms have known this for years, and routinely protect and build their investment by requiring the businesses they back to appoint an NED.

    NED role and responsibilities in a private company

    The role of NEDs in private companies is usually modelled on the role in public companies, although strictly speaking it is not subject to the UK Corporate Governance Code. In law there is no distinction between the duties of executive and non-executive directors.

    Whether a company is large or small, public or private, every director takes on significant legal duties:

    • acting within the company’s constitution, its articles of association
    • promoting the success of the company for the benefit of its shareholders as a whole
    • exercising independent judgement by forming their own informed view of the company’s activities
    • exercising reasonable care, skill and diligence
    • avoiding, or disclosing, conflicts of interest that may affect their objectivity
    • making sure minutes of board meetings are kept as a record of the board’s decisions.

    Unlike an executive director, who normally works full time, an NED works part time and cannot reasonably be expected to have the same detailed knowledge of the company’s affairs. Should an NED ever face a legal challenge, this would be taken into account.

    The NED is not involved in day-to-day management. On top of the duties every director carries, the NED is expected to:

    • constructively challenge and help develop the company’s strategy
    • take an active part in the board’s decision making
    • scrutinise management’s performance against agreed goals and objectives.

    What to do before joining a board

    As a prospective NED, you should:

    • carry out enough due diligence to be confident the company is one where you can make a strong, value-adding contribution
    • understand the level at which you will be expected to perform: more is expected of you in your own area of skill or experience
    • form a judgement on the culture, values and behaviours of the board, because your role is to uphold high standards of integrity
    • decide whether you like the CEO and the other directors, and whether they like you
    • gauge whether the board is open enough to support clear, collaborative decision making
    • review the letter of appointment to satisfy yourself that you can meet the minimum time requirement
    • disclose any conflict of interest and seek authorisation from the other directors.

    What to do once you are on the board

    Once in place as an NED, there are six main things to do:

    1. Complete a thorough induction programme tailored to you.
    2. Get the schedule of board meetings well in advance, and insist on high-quality papers early enough to prepare properly and make a meaningful contribution.
    3. Provide independent oversight through constructive, robust challenge, and help develop strategy by bringing your experience and expertise to bear.
    4. Take specialist, independent advice when you need it. The letter of appointment normally sets out how this works and when your costs will be reimbursed.
    5. Discharge your statutory duties as a director.
    6. Be prepared to resign in certain circumstances, although you should always talk first to the chair or other senior directors, and consider independent professional advice.

    In summary

    • As an NED in a private company you have the same duties and responsibilities as an executive director, but the part-time nature of the role means your focus is independent oversight.
    • Before joining a board, do enough due diligence to be sure it is the right company for you.
    • Once in place, apply your experience and expertise to add real value to the business.

    I sit on the board side of this question as a Non-Executive Director and Board Adviser to private, PE-backed and growth-stage businesses in consumer goods, industrial and technology sectors. More on how I work with boards is on the Board Advisory and NED page.

    Terry Irwin

    7 November 2026
  • How much time does the NED role take?

    Most adverts for non-executive directors state how many days a month or a year the role will take. That is less simple than it sounds, because NED work rarely fits into neat days.

    In one month, for example, you might spend:

    • seven hours preparing for a board meeting
    • a full day at the meeting
    • two hours on emails, including thinking time
    • an hour on the phone with a fellow director.

    The next month might look completely different.

    Because NEDs do not usually keep timesheets, boards find it hard to say exactly how much time their current NEDs give the role, let alone predict what it will need in future. Nobody knows what the coming year holds for the organisation, so the time needed may well turn out to be more than expected.

    As a broad guide, organisations other than listed companies typically ask NEDs to commit between one and four days a month, and chairs between two and nine days a month. In private companies the figure is usually around two days a month.

    Why the time required keeps growing

    A common misconception is that NEDs earn a large fee for a few days a month. In practice many NEDs work more hours than ever, often well beyond what they first committed to, because the scope of board responsibility has been widening for years.

    Today’s pressing issues include:

    • meeting regulatory requirements
    • expectations of stakeholder engagement
    • cyber security
    • disruptive technologies, AI above all
    • human capital management
    • company culture
    • environmental, social and governance (ESG) matters
    • equality, diversity and inclusion.

    Dealing with these often means extra meetings, more committees, more preparation on unfamiliar topics, and continual investment of time and money in learning.

    NED fees are a flat annual rate with no bonus. Executives may see extra effort rewarded at the year end, but NEDs do not get a pay rise for the extra hours. If the time required rises sharply, the effective hourly rate falls, in extreme cases to very little indeed.

    How NEDs spend their time

    A useful way to analyse the commitment is to split it into three parts:

    • planned contact time: board meetings, strategy days and committee meetings
    • preparation and personal time: reading board papers and researching the business and its markets
    • unplanned contact time: calls, emails and extra one-to-one meetings with the executive team.

    Planned contact time

    Make sure you can set this time aside alongside your other fixed commitments, especially if you will need time out of a full-time job.

    • Board meetings and AGMs. Dates are usually set before the year starts, and boards may give them in the advert, at interview or in the offer. Most boards meet for between three hours and a full day, four to ten times a year.
    • Strategy days. Expect one or two a year to develop and debate strategy, sometimes away from the usual venue and involving an overnight stay.
    • Committee meetings. Most NEDs join at least one committee. Its meetings tend to be shorter and less frequent than board meetings.

    Preparation and personal time

    You will have a fair amount of freedom over when you do the following:

    • Board meeting preparation. Board packs can run to hundreds of pages, especially in regulated businesses. NEDs spend anything from a couple of hours to two days preparing for each meeting.
    • Thinking time. Sometimes what matters is not what is in the pack but what is missing from it. Allow time to reflect on the organisation, its senior team and their performance.
    • Research. You will not have every answer and nobody expects you to, but you will need to take part in decisions across a wide range of subjects. Where you are less confident, read up independently or talk to fellow directors before the meeting. You need to know enough to make a decision you are comfortable with, because if something goes wrong the liability sits with the board collectively.
    • Continuing professional development. Keep building your skills as an NED, whether in governance, the company’s markets, or topics such as cyber risk and AI.

    Unplanned contact time

    The liability and responsibility that come with the role mean you are expected to give whatever it takes to do it well, at any time of year. That includes work that is hard to plan for:

    • Ad hoc meetings. Many boards talk between formal meetings when a time-sensitive matter comes up.
    • Emails. You will be expected to keep up with correspondence between board members.
    • One-to-one meetings with executive directors and other NEDs. These help you understand the culture and build rapport with the leadership team, who may want to use you as a sounding board.
    • Induction. Allow extra time when you first join. Board meetings are infrequent, so it can take a while to feel established unless you make a real effort early on. Do suggest what would help you.
    • Events. As well as challenging the board when needed, a good NED supports the executives. Attending company events and key conferences is one way to show it.
    • Annual appraisal. Usually a one-to-one with the chair, sometimes alongside a board evaluation and skills review.

    Questions to ask yourself before you apply

    • Do I clearly understand what the role requires, including both planned and additional time?
    • Can I meet the time requirement alongside my other commitments?
    • Can I handle switching between several roles and inboxes?
    • Do I believe in this organisation and its people enough to keep going when the role demands more than the expected hours?
    • Do I need permission from any current appointment to take this on?
    • How will I show the board that I am committed, and that I have thought through how I will manage my other responsibilities?

    I sit on the board side of this question as a Non-Executive Director and Board Adviser to private, PE-backed and growth-stage businesses in consumer goods, industrial and technology sectors. More on how I work with boards is on the Board Advisory and NED page.

    Terry Irwin

    7 November 2026
  • What scaling four markets taught me about boards

    As Managing Director for South East Asia, I built Henkel Adhesives from a standing start to c.£30m across four markets: Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.

    The experience taught me more about what boards should focus on, and what they get wrong, than any strategy framework or governance training ever could.

    Here’s what I learned.

    LESSON 1: Boards love strategy decks. Operators need execution clarity.

    Every market entry plan I presented to boards looked beautiful: market size analysis, competitive landscape, three-year revenue projections, go-to-market strategy.

    The board would nod, ask a few questions about TAM and competitive positioning, and approve the plan.

    Then I’d get on a plane to Jakarta or Kuala Lumpur and discover that the beautiful strategy deck had almost nothing to do with what mattered on the ground:

    • Can we hire the quality of sales talent we need in this market, at the salary bands HQ approved?
    • Do local distributors have the capability to execute our channel strategy, or are we assuming capabilities that don’t exist?
    • What’s the real payment term dynamic with customers in this market, not what the contract says, but what happens?

    These weren’t questions boards asked. But they were the questions that determined whether we’d hit plan or miss by 30%.

    What I learned: The best boards don’t just approve strategy. They pressure-test execution assumptions.

    They ask:

    • “What has to be true operationally for this to work?”
    • “What are the 3 things most likely to go wrong in the first 90 days?”
    • “How will we know if we’re off-track before it shows up in the financials?”

    LESSON 2: International expansion isn’t about scaling “The Model”. It’s about adapting it

    HQ boards love the idea of “scaling the proven model” internationally:

    “We’ve succeeded in the UK. Now let’s replicate that in South East Asia.”

    Sounds logical. Rarely works.

    What worked in London didn’t work in Kuala Lumpur:

    • UK customers wanted premium products and were willing to pay for brand. Malaysian customers cared more about price and wanted functional value.
    • UK distribution was consolidated (3-4 major players).
    • Indonesia was fragmented (hundreds of regional distributors with wildly varying capability).
    • UK marketing was digital-heavy (Facebook, Google). Thailand required offline retail presence and trade shows.

    The revenue model, pricing strategy, and go-to-market had to be adapted, sometimes radically, to fit local market dynamics.

    But boards didn’t want to hear “we’re adapting the model.” They wanted consistency. Efficiency. Leverage.

    What I learned: Boards need to get comfortable with managed inconsistency across markets.

    International growth isn’t about cloning the HQ playbook.

    It’s about preserving the core (brand, product quality, values) while adapting everything else (pricing, GTM, partnerships) to local reality.

    The best boards ask:

    • “What’s non-negotiable across all markets?” (the core)
    • “What needs to flex by market?” (everything else)
    • “How do we balance local adaptation with operational efficiency?”

    LESSON 3: The biggest risk isn’t competition. It’s your own assumptions about how the market works

    Boards spend a lot of time discussing competitive threats.

    “Who are the local players?”

    “What’s their market share?”

    “How will they respond to our entry?”

    Valid questions. But in my experience, competition was rarely the reason international expansions failed.

    The bigger risk: our own assumptions about market structure, customer behaviour, and operational dynamics.

    Example from Indonesia

    We assumed customers would pay for premium products if we educated them on quality and performance benefits.

    Reality: Price was the primary decision driver for 80% of the market. Quality mattered, but only within a narrow price band. Our premium positioning isolated us to a tiny high-end segment that couldn’t support the revenue plan.

    We didn’t lose to competitors. We lost to our own flawed assumptions about customer willingness to pay.

    What I learned: The best boards don’t just review competitive landscape. They pressure-test market assumptions.

    They ask:

    • “What’s our core assumption about why customers will buy from us?”
    • “How have we validated that assumption with real customer data?”
    • “What would cause us to be wrong?”

    LESSON 4: Cultural fit matters more than skills on paper

    Boards spend a lot of time reviewing CVs and approving senior│

    hires.

    “This candidate has 15 years’ experience in consumer goods.”

    “They’ve worked for Unilever and P&G.”

    “Their track record is solid.”

    Great. But that tells you nothing about whether they’ll succeed in YOUR business.

    I hired brilliant executives with flawless CVs who failed spectacularly, not because they lacked skills, but because they couldn’t adapt to our operating culture.

    Example

    I hired a Country MD in Thailand who’d run a P&G division profitably for 8 years. On paper, perfect.

    In practice: they struggled because P&G’s culture was process-driven, matrix-managed, and consensus-oriented.

    Our culture required entrepreneurial decisiveness, comfort with ambiguity, and ability to operate without HQ support.

    The skills were there. The cultural fit wasn’t.

    What I learned: Boards should spend less time reviewing CVs and more time pressure-testing cultural fit.

    Questions that matter:

    • “Have they operated in ambiguous, under-resourced environments before?”
    • “Do they need clear process and structure, or can they build it themselves?”
    • “How do they handle being wrong, because they will be wrong repeatedly in a new market?”

    What this means for boards today

    International expansion is back on the agenda for many boards, either because PE funds are pushing portfolio companies to scale internationally, or because growth in home markets is slowing.

    But most boards aren’t structured to provide the right kind of challenge and support.

    They’re great at reviewing strategy decks and competitive analysis.

    They’re much weaker at pressure-testing execution assumptions, validating market hypotheses, and ensuring cultural fit in senior hires.

    If you’re a board considering international expansion, ask yourself:

    • Do we have directors who’ve scaled businesses internationally, not just approved expansion plans?
    • Are we asking the right questions about execution risk, or are we just reviewing strategy slides?
    • Can we tell the difference between a market entry plan that│ will work and one that looks good on PowerPoint?

    Because scaling across markets isn’t about having a great strategy.

    It’s about knowing what breaks when you cross borders, and fixing it before it kills the plan.

    Terry Irwin

    15 April 2026
  • AI decisions boards are getting wrong

    Most boards are approaching AI the wrong way. Not because they’re ignoring it. Quite the opposite. Boards are holding AI strategy sessions, commissioning vendor reports, and adding “AI oversight” to committee charters.

    The problem: they’re treating AI as a governance topic when it should be a commercial opportunity.

    Here’s what boards are getting wrong, and how to reframe the discussion.

    MISTAKE 1: Treating AI as risk management, not value creation

    Most board-level AI discussions start with risk:

    • What are the regulatory implications?
    • How do we mitigate algorithmic bias?
    • What’s our data governance framework?

    These are important questions. But if that’s where the discussion stays, the board is missing the point.

    AI isn’t primarily a risk management topic. It’s a commercial leverage opportunity, and boards should be asking:

    • Where can AI compress cycle time or reduce cost-to-serve by 30-50%?
    • Which customer pain points could AI solve better than current solutions?
    • What proprietary data do we have that could become a competitive moat if we applied AI effectively?

    The best boards I’ve worked with flip the sequence: start with commercial opportunity, then layer in governance and risk management to protect the value being created. Risk-first AI discussions lead to slow, cautious implementation.

    Opportunity-first discussions lead to disciplined experimentation with clear ROI targets.

    MISTAKE 2: Delegating AI to the CTO (or worse, a consultant)

    I see this pattern repeatedly: board asks CTO or Chief Data Officer to “lead our AI strategy”, then receives a 40-slide deck full of technology architecture and vendor comparisons.

    The problem: AI strategy isn’t a technology question. It’s a business model question.

    The critical AI decisions boards need to make aren’t:

    • Which LLM provider should we use?
    • Should we build or buy AI capability?

    The critical decisions are:

    • Which parts of our business model could AI fundamentally reshape?
    • Are we deploying AI to defend current margins, or to attack new markets?
    • What happens to our workforce, our pricing, our customer relationships if AI delivers what vendors promise?

    These aren’t CTO questions. These are CEO and board-level strategy questions that require commercial judgment, not technical expertise.

    By delegating AI to the technology team, boards abdicate responsibility for the commercial decisions that matter most.

    MISTAKE 3: Accepting vendor prmomises without proof

    AI vendors are very good at selling the future:
    “Our AI will reduce customer support costs by 40%.”

    “Our platform will increase sales productivity by 3x.”

    “Deployment takes 6-8 weeks with minimal disruption.”

    Boards hear these promises, nod approvingly, and approve

    budgets. Six months later, the AI project is behind schedule, over

    budget, and delivering 20% of promised value.

    Why? Because boards aren’t asking the right questions:

    • What’s the proof this works in OUR context (not a generic case study)?
    • What assumptions underpin the ROI model?
    • What needs to be true operationally for this to deliver promised value?
    • What’s the kill criterion if it’s not working after 90 days

    The best boards I work with treat AI deployment like commercial diligence:

    • Pilot first (small, defined scope)
    • Measure rigorously (actual results vs vendor promises)
    • Scale only after proof (don’t enterprise-deploy on faith)

    This isn’t anti-innovation. It’s commercial discipline.

    MISTAKE 4: No clear ownership of AI value delivery

    Most boards know someone should “own AI strategy.” But when I ask “Who’s accountable for AI delivering commercial value?”, the answer is often vague.

    “We have an AI steering committee.”

    “The CTO is leading it, with input from the CEO.”

    “It’s a cross-functional initiative.”

    Translation: no one owns it.

    AI projects that succeed have clear ownership:

    • One executive (typically CEO, COO, or Chief Commercial Officer) owns the P&L impact of AI deployment
    • That executive reports AI progress to the board monthly (not quarterly)
    • Success is measured in commercial outcomes (revenue, margin, customer satisfaction), not AI deployment metrics (models trained, data pipelines built)

    If the board can’t name the executive who’ll be fired if AI doesn’t deliver value, the governance structure is broken.

    What good looks like: The three questions boards should ask

    Instead of “Do we have an AI strategy?”, which inevitably produces a 50-slide deck and no action, boards should ask three specific questions:

    1. WHERE HAVE WE RUN A 90-DAY AI PILOT WITH MEASURABLE ROI?

    Not “Where are we planning to use AI?”, where have we actually deployed it, measured results, and proven value?

    If the answer is “nowhere yet”, the board should ask why. AI is not a 2027 strategy topic. It’s a 2026 execution topic.

    2. WHAT’S THE COMMERCIAL CASE FOR SCALING AI BEYOND THE PILOT

    If the pilot worked, what’s the business case for scaling across the organization?

    This forces the team to connect AI deployment to commercial outcomes:

    • If we scale this AI tool across 500 customer support agents, what’s the margin impact?
    • If we deploy this in sales, what’s the revenue uplift vs cost of deployment?

    If the team can’t build a clear commercial case, don’t scale.

    3. WHO OWNS AI VALUE DELIVERY, AND WHAT’S THEIR 90-DAY SCORECARD?

    Who’s accountable? What are they measured on? What happens if AI doesn’t deliver?

    These questions force clarity and accountability, which is what boards are supposed to provide.

    The bottom line

    AI is not a governance checkbox. It’s a commercial opportunity that requires the same discipline boards apply to M&A, international expansion, or major product launches:

    • Clear business case
    • Pilot before scaling
    • Measure actual results vs promises
    • Assign ownership and accountability

    Boards that treat AI this way will capture value. Boards that treat it as a risk management topic will watch competitors move faster.

    Terry Irwin

    15 April 2026

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